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Improving patient safety across entire healthcare systems remains an urgent and 
complex challenge.(1) One important strategy for system-wide safety improvement 
involves investigating and addressing the system-wide sources of risk that contribute 
to unsafe care. Common types of safety incident—such as wrong site surgery or 
delayed diagnosis—can harm different patients in different places at different times, 
but often result from very similar circumstances and underlying problems.(2) 
Equally, factors that contribute to unsafe care arise in many parts of the healthcare 
system: poor design of equipment, gaps in training, misguided regulatory incentives, 
inadequate funding, and much else besides.(3) The healthcare systems of England 
and Norway are currently experimenting with a new and ambitious approach to 
address system-wide sources of risk. Both have created national, independent safety 
investigation bodies that will investigate serious patient safety risks that span the 
healthcare system and develop system-wide recommendations for learning and 
improvement. In England, the Healthcare Safety Investigation Branch (HSIB) 
became operational in April 2017,(4) following proposals put forward in this 
journal.(5) In Norway, the State Investigation Commission for Health and Care 
Services (UKOM) becomes operational in 2019.(6)  
 
Independent, system-wide and learning-focused safety investigation bodies like these 
have long and successful histories in other safety-critical sectors such as aviation and 
the railways.(7) But in healthcare, this is a relatively new and untested approach that 
faces significant challenges.(6) Some of these challenges are social and cultural, such 
as building trust and maintaining independence.(8) But many of the most immediate 
challenges are more practical and tangible: developing systems-focused investigation 
methods and safety analysis tools; establishing new approaches to designing 
impactful, influential and system-wide recommendations; and building new 
infrastructure to share findings and knowledge in ways that support the translation of 
recommendations into action. In addressing these challenges, these new 
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investigation bodies have a unique opportunity to have a broad and meaningful 
impact on system-wide safety, and to fundamentally reformulate how safety 
investigations are conducted across healthcare. To do this, five core strategies would 
seem particularly important in guiding the development of these new investigative 
organisations (Table 1). These strategies translate the fundamental principles of 
national, system-wide safety investigation into more concrete objectives for strategic 
development,(5,6,7) and draw on both early experiences in the English health system 
combined with insights from other learning-oriented, systems-focused investigative 
practices.(8) 
Untangle systemic risks: explain the sources of system-wide 
safety problems  
National safety investigation bodies need to relentlessly examine the serious, system-
spanning risks that no other organisation is in a position to fully grapple with. Many 
safety issues are challenging because they emerge from the collective actions of many 
different healthcare actors—such as healthcare providers, regulators, funders and 
manufacturers—but cannot be solved by any single one.(10) The underlying sources 
of system-wide risks can be perceived by many organisations as simply ‘too big’ to 
tackle on their own. This includes system-wide issues such as poor staffing levels and 
gaps in workforce planning; inappropriately designed and poorly integrated 
technology and equipment; and the disruptive impacts of organisational restructures 
and service reorganisations. The systemic sources of risk in healthcare are rarely 
subjected to practical, regular and dispassionate investigation—and that is precisely 
what these new safety investigation bodies must do. Their independent status and 
system-wide remit give them both the ability and the responsibility to regularly and 
unflinchingly reveal how serious safety issues at the ‘sharp end’ of care are driven by 
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complex, system-wide problems at the ‘blunt end’.(5) To do this effectively, national 
investigation bodies need to strike a careful balance. They need to identify tangible, 
concrete safety problems that either have caused—or have the potential to cause—
considerable harm to patients, and carefully trace the factors throughout the 
healthcare system that produce and contribute to those problems. But they also need 
to avoid casting the net too wide(11) and becoming overwhelmed by the scale and 
quantity of safety issues that exist across healthcare. Investigative attention needs to 
focus on the factors that present the greatest risk to the safety of future patients, and 
that no single organisation can easily address on its own. National healthcare 
investigation bodies need clear criteria not only for prioritising which risks to 
investigate to start with, but also to determine which systemic safety factors should 
be focused on as investigations unfold.  
 
Reconfigure systems: construct innovative and co-creative 
recommendations 
National safety investigation bodies need to focus on developing robust 
recommendations that seek to fundamentally reengineer key parts of the patient 
safety landscape. Systematic efforts to manage patient safety are barely two decades 
old and safety systems remain relatively under-developed in many areas of 
healthcare.(12) Improving system-wide safety therefore requires much more than 
issuing recommendations that simply tinker with one small piece of existing policy or 
practice at a time. Tackling system-wide risks requires system-wide work. 
Investigation bodies have unique powers to issue recommendations to any and all 
actors across the healthcare system.(6,9) They need to use those powers to bring 
together diverse experts and organisations into new coalitions capable of 
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reconfiguring key aspects of the healthcare system. Safety recommendations must be 
carefully crafted to set ambitious goals, align the motivations of different 
stakeholders and foster collaborative work. Initially, this will likely involve 
recommendations that target the creation or reconfiguration of basic building-blocks 
of patient safety infrastructure, such as new systems for data collection, data sharing 
and safety management in specific parts of healthcare. These fundamental 
components will need to be targeted because many aspects of healthcare safety 
systems remain at a relatively early stage of maturity. National investigators in other 
industries do the same—as illustrated by the foundational recommendations made to 
the autonomous vehicle industry in response to recent failures.(13,14) Developing 
systemic safety recommendations of this nature will be complex and challenging. To 
help ensure such safety recommendations have an impact—and to understand and 
learn when they do not—requirements to commission systematic, independent 
evaluation should be built in to all bundles of safety recommendations. National 
safety investigation bodies also need to conduct their own regular evaluations of the 
impacts of their safety recommendations, and where necessary investigate instances 
where the health system has struggled to learn and continues to expose patients to 
unacceptable risk.  
Show your working: develop methodology and share ongoing 
evaluation 
National safety investigation bodies need to be visible and active leaders in the 
development and application of rigorous safety investigation and analysis methods. 
The analytical demands of conducting national, system-wide safety investigations 
that span entire healthcare systems are considerable. Investigations will need to 
encompass everything from individual cognition to the design of regulatory regimes. 
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Many safety analysis tools and investigation models exist,(15) some specifically 
applied to healthcare.(16,17) But the diversity and complexity of healthcare means 
that a broad and pragmatic methodological approach will be needed. National 
investigation bodies will need to identify, test, adapt and evaluate a range of methods 
to build a toolbox of approaches that can be flexibly applied to different problems in 
diverse settings. Existing methods and tools will need to be carefully adapted to fit 
the different contexts of healthcare, and to ensure that they are practical to use and 
straightforward to explain. Moreover, it is essential that this methodological toolbox 
is developed and evaluated in public—both to widely share investigative tools and 
examples of good practice, and to build trust and establish the legitimacy of 
investigative findings and recommendations. The activities and outputs of 
investigations themselves will also need to be carefully and thoroughly evaluated, to 
support ongoing improvement and to model the rigour and honesty that these 
investigation bodies seek to encourage in the wider system.  
Narrative and voice: reveal the complexity of practice and 
experience 
National safety investigation bodies need to be at the forefront of explaining the 
experiences of patients, families—and staff—impacted by safety events and the 
practical challenges of delivery safe healthcare. Harm can accumulate and evolve over 
time throughout patient journeys,(12,18) and many critical aspects of healthcare 
practice can remain invisible to those overseeing healthcare systems.(19) Patients and 
families are often the only people who experience the full trajectory of care and 
harm,(20) and frontline staff are often the only people who understand the full 
demands of practical work. All this hard-won knowledge is essential to improving 
patient safety, but is not always well used.(21) National safety investigation bodies 
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are uniquely placed to give voice to the sometimes ignored patients, families and 
practitioners affected by safety issues, legitimising this practical knowledge and 
producing authoritative narratives that explain both the experience and emergence of 
harm. Investigations should sensitively explore the reflections and aspirations of 
those affected, produce accounts of safety events from multiple viewpoints, document 
the gaps between practical work and the expectations and policies that seek to guide 
it,(22) and experiment with other ways of honouring the practical wisdom of those 
closest to events.  
Make risks visible: generate active responsibility and practical 
knowledge 
National safety investigation bodies need to consistently generate new knowledge of 
systemic risk, draw widespread attention to those risks and create public 
accountability for addressing them. Practical information on specific sources of risk 
in healthcare systems is not always widely accessible.(23) In other safety-critical 
industries, accident investigators routinely publish detailed investigations that 
document the most serious safety problems, building an ever-growing open 
repository of practical knowledge on the nature of risk. National investigation bodies 
in healthcare need to do the same. They also need to regularly and forcefully direct 
attention to the patient safety problems that they identify by supplementing technical 
reports with engaging films and other compelling media;(7,24,25) highlighting cross-
cutting safety issues and “most wanted” or “watch lists” such as those published by 
investigators in other industries;(26,27) and visualising the risk landscape to map 
past and ongoing investigations and build a public picture of safety priorities. 
Ultimately, national investigation bodies will need to create new forms of public 
accountability for safety improvement, and maintain a public record of safety 
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recommendations—alongside subsequent responses, actions and commentary—to 
provide a mechanism for generating “active responsibility” for improving safety in the 
future.(28)  
An experiment in improving investigation  
The establishment of independent, system-spanning safety investigation bodies in 
England and Norway is a watershed moment for patient safety. But this experiment 
in health policy remains at an early stage and faces many practical challenges, each of 
which needs to be addressed carefully and thoughtfully. These new organisations 
have a deep responsibility to the patients, families, practitioners and policymakers 
who worked hard to bring them into existence. They must now develop robust 
investigation methods, model a culture of openness and learning, work tirelessly and 
intelligently to drive systemic change—and ultimately speak truth to power.  
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